Currently reading: Lessons in survival: Merc's Joachim Zahn showed car makers how to beat a crisis

Joachim Zahn doubled Mercedes production during the 1970s by refusing to chase reckless growth

Who would envy Ola Källenius, tasked as he is with keeping the juggernaut of Mercedes-Benz driving forward through a tornado? Surely nobody. But if anybody could provide this CEO with reassurance, it would be one of his predecessors, Joachim Zahn, under whom the German manufacturer emerged from the strikingly similar storm of the 1970s not merely intact but in better shape than ever before.

Autocar first interviewed Zahn in June 1972, a year after he’d been appointed president of Mercedes’ parent company Daimler-Benz, after 13 years as its finance chief.

“Just look at what has happened in the last 10 years,” he implored, gesturing at the various charts and tables spread across his desk. “We’ve now reached a saturation point in Europe. What worries me in this context is that many manufacturers keep increasing their production potential. We’re moving towards a useless and definitely dangerous state of over-equipment.”

As the economies of Western Europe were successfully rebuilt after the war, demand for cars had outstripped supply, because most people had never been able to afford one before – fuelling rapid growth of British, French, Italian and West German car firms. By 1965, though, signs that the democratisation of motoring in the region was nearly complete were starting to appear.

Inflation had then begun to outpace workers’ wages, leading unions to organise frequent strikes at car factories. And matters got even thornier when the US tried to escape its own economic strife by unpegging the dollar from gold, as this messed with exchange rates.

“The psychological environment and strength of anti-establishment demonstrations add to the other threats weighing on the industry,” acknowledged Zahn in 1972. “Our financial results for last year are weaker than before. The strikes in the autumn alone cost Mercedes some 23,000 cars – that is about 7% of production – and 10% of trucks.

“The cost of an unrealistic policy of floating currency and, later, the monetary readjustment have cost German industry. Our costs have grown considerably, while we didn’t increase our prices [for a year] since we wanted to help stop inflation.”

Car makers were also under pressure to reduce road casualties, but Zahn believed Mercedes had by then proven, through hosting a safety conference and revealing an ‘experimental safety vehicle’, “to the men in charge [in the US] that we are full of goodwill, even if a final solution has not yet been found”.

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Yet the industry’s biggest problem of all, he felt, was that “government neutrality towards the car has become hostility and is often based on demagogy. You find it everywhere in varying degrees: speed limits, traffic limitations, parking limitations, safety and pollution rules, fiscal rules…”

Actually, something even worse was just around the corner: an oil crisis (Autocar, 29 April). Mercedes’ German order books in December 1973 were 60% down on normal levels, autobahns were limited to 62mph and there were even four Sundays when driving was banned.

Many predicted the end of large, luxury and sports cars as oil prices stayed high even after conflict in the Middle East ended, spurring many makers to hurriedly create small cars – but Mercedes wasn’t among them, Zahn believing that “‘small’ is not synonymous with ‘economical’” and diesel power was a wiser bet.

In any case, he was still preoccupied with the problem of overcapacity, predicting: “We will soon find out that investment mistakes have been made by those who based their future projections on the expansion rates of the ’60s.”

That didn’t mean he was against growth, though: rather he believed that “growth for growth with no other consideration is a dangerous philosophy, but politicians and intellectuals who advocate zero growth have no idea of the social and political tensions that would be created by a stop of all expansion and of all the dramatic changes it would impose on our world.”

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Meeting Zahn for a third time in 1977, we hailed him as “one of the industry leaders who has had the most brilliant results”, his level-headed realism having doubled Mercedes’ production and made it the biggest non-American car maker. It had built some 370,000 cars (158,000 of which were diesels, enabling the firm to comply with US eco regulations) and 248,000 trucks and buses in 1976, a profit margin of 1.7% equalling £98m (£680m today).

He jumped straight back on his hobby horse: “Everyone entered a mad race to expand. This is why I have reservations about the future of our industry. We already went through a major battle in 1974-1975, but there will be others. Several firms resorted to massive layoffs. We are among the very few who have never suffered overcapacity.”

Zahn retired in 1979 and is fondly remembered by his old company as having “felt equally responsible to shareholders and employees”.

If he could see the industry now, we know exactly what he would say!

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